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In 2010, the state of Maryland became the first jurisdiction in the
world to adopt legislation authorizing a new form of corporate
governance—the benefit corporation. Six years later, the form has been
adopted in thirty-two U.S. jurisdictions and one country (Italy), has been
introduced into the legislatures of two additional countries, and is being
considered in many others. More than 4,500 benefit corporations have
been formed in the U.S. and have raised hundreds of millions of dollars.
One benefit corporation has already filed an S-1 with the SEC to go public.
Why has corporate governance suddenly taken this new turn, after
traditional corporations dominated the legal and financial structure of
capitalism for more than 100 years?
On June 27 and 28, 2016, legal scholars assembled in Seattle for the
eighth annual Berle Symposium to discuss and debate this question. The
Symposium was put together by Chuck O’Kelley, Director of the Adolf
Berle Center. B Lab, the nonprofit organization that the three of us
founded was proud to be a co-sponsor. We were all honored by Colin
Mayer’s willingness to allow us to center the conference around his work
on the role of commitment to stakeholders in creating a successful
corporate enterprise. While views on the effects and merits of the new
form were broad, the conference made it clear that many of the unspoken
assumptions surrounding corporate law must be re-examined, and the
creation of this new corporate form provides an excellent opportunity to
do so.
During the twentieth century, economies across the globe moved
toward corporate capitalism, as large corporations with disparate
shareholders began to control significant amounts of private capital. In
order to address this development, the legal and financial sectors
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developed the idea of “shareholder primacy,” which posits that
corporations and similar organizations should be operated primarily for
the benefit of shareholders. Legally, this structure was intended to protect
investors from mismanagement of their capital. Economically, primacy
was viewed as efficient, because it focused management on creating
profits, which were thought to represent economic efficiency: Milton
Friedman famously said that the social responsibility of corporations was
the creation of profits.
While corporate law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the law
generally requires, encourages, or permits shareholder primacy. This state
of the law is demonstrated by a series of papers recently drafted by experts
in more than thirty countries in response to a 2015 questionnaire prepared
by Professor Robert Eccles of the Harvard Business School. (But see
Carol Liao’s contribution to this issue, contrasting the Canadian view.)
The questionnaire was answered for the U.S. by the American Bar
Association’s Task Force on Sustainable Development. That response
concluded that:
The United States is a “shareholder primacy” jurisdiction, meaning
that the primary focus of corporations is to return profit to
shareholders. If stakeholder needs are considered, they are a
secondary concern.

B Lab was created nine years ago to address the challenges created
by a financial system focused only on shareholder value. We seek to create
an infrastructure that will enable business to be a force for good, but
believe that shareholder primacy leads to the misapplication of resources
and limits the ability of corporations to raise money in mainstream capital
markets while operating in a responsible and sustainable manner. For this
reason, we asked Bill Clark (whose contribution to this Symposium
discusses the basis for society to demand stakeholder governance) to draft
legislation addressing this concern. His model was the one adopted in
Maryland in 2010 and in most other jurisdictions that have authorized
benefit corporations. Two other contributors to the issue (Larry
Hamermesh and Rick Alexander) were involved in the drafting of another
model, which has been adopted in Delaware. But all jurisdictions adopting
benefit corporation legislation, whatever model they use, allow
corporations to reject shareholder primacy, and to place the interests of
stakeholders (including employees, the community, and the environment)
on par with the interests of shareholders.
We promoted this legislation because want all stakeholders to be able
to distinguish good companies from good marketing. We have developed
a certification for corporations that demonstrate a positive impact on all of
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their stakeholders (Certified B Corps), but we do not want those certified
entities to experience mission drift due to legal pressure to produce short
term profits for shareholders. The benefit corporation is a way to resist
this pressure. Indeed, where the form is available, we now require that
corporations become benefit corporations. Mike Dorff’s article addresses
some of the more subtle issues raised by our certification, and we greatly
appreciate his insights.
By rejecting shareholder primacy, the benefit corporation endeavors
to create a solid foundation for long-term mission alignment and value
creation. It protects mission through capital raises and leadership changes,
creates more flexibility when evaluating potential sale and liquidity
options, and prepares closely held businesses to lead a mission-driven life
post-IPO. Most importantly, this legal form changes the purpose of
business from one focused on the creation of shareholder value to one that
creates shared value.
Benefit corporation statutes differ from current corporate law by (1)
providing for a broad corporate purpose to create a material positive
impact on society and the environment; (2) creating accountability that
gives shareholders the ability to hold directors responsible for pursuing the
public purpose; and (3) requiring transparent reporting of overall social
and environmental performance in order to allow both shareholders and
other stakeholders to know what the company is doing to achieve its
purpose. This model creates better governance, mitigates risk, and allows
business to create value for society and shareholders.
Benefit corporation law is a critical tool to allow private capital to be
invested in a manner that creates shared and durable value for everyone.
But a tool is only as good as the person who uses it. As highlighted in Rick
Alexander’s essay, shareholders must understand the value of firm
commitment, and, more importantly, the ultimate source of wealth for
universal investors, which is thriving financial markets and a healthy,
peaceful, and prosperous planet. These goals can only be attained and
maintained for the long term if private capital is allocated and invested in
a manner that creates value for everyone. So investors must learn to use
benefit corporation law as a tool to require the companies they own to
create value in a responsible and sustainable manner.
*

*

*

*

The need for this new corporate form has never been more urgent.
There is a populist movement against the establishment. Brexit,
recent U.S. elections, and political developments across Europe and
beyond suggest a populace that believes the system is rigged against them.
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Global events, including financial crises, increasing inequality, and
climate and food injustices, indicate that the fundamental dissatisfaction
with the status quo stems from economic circumstance. Led by Colin
Mayer’s work on corporate betrayal of the stakeholders corporations
should be serving, the conference addressed how this “rigging” may be as
much a result of the structure of our financial system as of our political
institutions. The work reflected in this symposium issue will contribute to
this important discussion, and highlight the leadership opportunities and
responsibilities of the business and financial communities. Their
leadership can help to create a more inclusive economy that works for
everyone.
We believe business needs a new operating system, a set of
normative and institutional changes that allow capitalism to equal its
promise. The evolution of capitalism requires an evolution in corporate
law, one that allows company directors to serve all stakeholders and
creates mechanisms so that investors can hold them accountable. Business,
as one of the most powerful forces in society, has an historic opportunity
and obligation to drive a positive culture shift to use business as a force
for good. If business has had a role in leading us to our current point, then
it must have a role in forging the path forward.

